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Management of transboundary river basins—or, for that 
matter, any transboundary natural system—is a notoriously difficult 
problem.  Typically, political and legal authority is divided along 
geographic lines that do not map well onto the boundaries of 
natural systems, so that transboundary cooperation and 
coordination are needed to manage the resource effectively.  In 
many cases, however, the transboundary natural system affects only 
a portion of each nation-state it straddles and thus may be 
perceived at the national level as a regional-level (and therefore 
lower priority) concern.  This invites a certain level of indifference 
or even neglect at the level of nation-states—traditionally, the 
exclusive authors and subjects of public international law, which in 
its pure Westphalian form is said to consist of legal obligations 
owed by sovereign states to other sovereign states.1 
 
 †  Professor and Henry J. Fletcher Chair, University of Minnesota Law 
School. 
 1.  In a classic definition, J.L. Brierly stated that international law is “the 
body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in 
their relations with one another.”  J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (Sir Humphrey Waldock 
1
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That, in a nutshell, has been the historic pattern in North 
America’s Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin.  Straddling the 
boundary between the United States and Canada, the Great Lakes 
are arguably the world’s most important freshwater system, 
comprising approximately twenty percent of the planet’s fresh 
surface water.2  The Great Lakes are also a priceless economic, 
aesthetic, recreational, cultural, and ecological asset.  In 1909, the 
United States and Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) undertook 
to manage the Great Lakes and other transboundary waterways 
through the Boundary Waters Treaty.3  Subsequent ancillary 
agreements included a series of Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreements.  Yet despite these promising vehicles for 
transboundary cooperation, management of the Great Lakes has 
rarely been seen as a pressing national concern in either the 
United States or Canada.  For their part, the eight U.S. states4 and 
two Canadian provinces5 that lie wholly or in part within the Great 
Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin individually lack the capacity to manage 
the lakes and the St. Lawrence River effectively without 
cooperation of all the others.  Collectively, because they are not 
sovereign nation-states for purposes of international law and 
because their respective federal constitutions vest the foreign affairs 
power at the federal level,6 these subnational governments lack the 
legal authority to enter into binding transboundary agreements 
among themselves.  What is needed, then, is some alternative 
coordinating mechanism—one that, unlike international law, does 
not depend on legally binding agreements between sovereign 
 
ed., 6th ed. 1963).  On this view, it was “widely agreed that states were the singular 
subjects of international law, with other actors existing only as objects of the law, 
interacting with the international legal system but only indirectly through their 
national governments.”  Lauren Groth, Transforming Accountability: A Proposal for 
Reconsidering How Human Rights Obligations Are Applied to Private Military Security 
Firms, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 29, 49 (2012). 
 2.  See GOV’T OF CANADA & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE GREAT LAKES: AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS AND RESOURCE BOOK 3 (3d ed. 1995), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/atlas/index.html. 
 3.  Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary 
Waters, and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. 
Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].  
 4.  Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
and New York. 
 5.  Ontario and Quebec. 
 6.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, 
Alliance, or Confederation . . . .”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”). 
2
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nation-states, yet carries sufficient normative weight to actually 
influence and constrain the actions of subnational governments (in 
the case of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system, eight U.S. states 
and two Canadian provinces). 
This article argues that the recently adopted Great Lakes 
Water Resources Compact7 and Agreement8 represent just such a 
subnational but transboundary coordinating mechanism.  The 
substantive aims of the Compact and Agreement are relatively 
modest: they seek to curb or prevent large-scale exports of fresh 
water out of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin.9  More important 
than the substantive goals, however, are the mechanisms by which 
these shared policy goals are to be implemented and enforced.  
The Compact is a legally binding agreement among the eight U.S. 
basin states, duly authorized by Congress as required by the U.S. 
Constitution.10  It requires its member states to adopt and 
implement enforceable processes, measures, and substantive 
commitments to manage Great Lakes Basin water withdrawals and 
diversions in accordance with standards set out in the Compact;11 
further, it establishes a regional coordinating body made up of 
representatives of the member states to make decisions of region-
wide scope or impact and to review the member states’ compliance 
with the Compact.12  The Agreement is a parallel, non-binding, 
 
 7.  Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. 
No. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008) [hereinafter Compact]. 
 8.  Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement, Dec. 13, 2005 [hereinafter Agreement], available at http://www 
.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/Great_Lakes-St_Lawrence_River_Basin 
_Sustainable_Water_Resources_Agreement.pdf. 
 9.  See generally Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing Resources with Interstate Compacts: 
A Perspective from the Great Lakes, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173 (2007) (recounting the 
legal and policy context and negotiating history of the Great Lakes Compact and 
Agreement). 
 10.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”). 
 11.  See, e.g., Compact, supra note 7, § 4.3(3) (“No Party may approve a 
Proposal [for a new or increased withdrawal, consumptive use, or diversion] if the 
Party determines that the Proposal is inconsistent with this Compact or the 
Standard of Review and Decision or any implementing rules or regulations 
promulgated thereunder.”); id. § 4.11 (establishing a decision-making standard 
setting forth criteria for approval of withdrawals and consumptive uses, including, 
inter alia, requirements that return flows go to the watershed of origin; that there 
are no significant individual or cumulative adverse effects to water quality or 
quantity; that implementation incorporates environmentally sound and 
economically feasible water conservation measures; and that the proposed 
withdrawal or consumptive use is reasonable). 
 12.  See id. §§ 2.1–.2 (establishing a Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin 
3
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good-faith agreement that extends identical requirements to the 
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and establishes a 
Regional Body of which the eight states and two provinces are all 
members.13  Although the Agreement is legally non-binding 
(because U.S. states and Canadian provinces may not make 
international law), it is considered morally obligatory; and the eight 
U.S. states are already, in effect, legally bound to its substantive 
provisions insofar as they are identical to those in the legally 
binding Compact.  The Compact, then, should ensure the 
cooperation and compliance of eight of the ten parties, thereby 
creating an incentive for Ontario and Quebec also to cooperate 
and comply, secure in the knowledge that there should be no 
defectors among the more numerous parties on the U.S. side of the 
border.  Moreover, because each of the states and provinces has 
adopted implementing legislation to give effect to the 
commitments set out in the Compact and Agreement,14 even the 
provinces have in a sense bound themselves.  It is in that sense that 
the Compact and Agreement create a unique kind of 
transboundary normativity, even in the absence of public 
international law. 
Part I of this article will briefly describe the Great Lakes-
St. Lawrence ecosystem and the environmental and natural 
resource management challenges it entails, as well as the principal 
institutions that have evolved to attempt to address those 
challenges.  Part II will describe the Great Lakes Water Resources 
Compact and the Great Lakes Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement, discuss the impetus for the development of these 
instruments, and assess their significance for transboundary 
coordination in the Great Lakes Basin.  Part III will explore the 
implications of these developments for transboundary coordination  
 
 
Water Resources Council consisting of the governors of the states party to the 
Compact and defining its powers and duties); id. § 3.4(2) (authorizing the Council 
to review the water management and conservation programs and policies of the 
parties); id. § 4.5(1)(f) (providing for regional review of “regionally significant or 
potentially precedent-setting” proposals for withdrawals or consumptive uses). 
 13.  See Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(1)–(2) (establishing a Regional 
Body “composed of the Governor or Premier of each of the Parties, or a person 
designated by each of them”).  
 14.  See Projects: Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact 
Implementation, COUNCIL GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, http://www.cglg.org 
/projects/water/CompactImplementation.asp (last updated Feb. 17, 2011) 
(providing a link to implementing state legislation). 
4
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in the Great Lakes and in other transboundary natural resource 
management contexts. 
I. THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN                                                      
AND ITS MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 
The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin spans a vast area in the 
heart of the North American continent.  Comprising five of the 
world’s twelve largest continental lakes by area, including three of 
the four largest,15 plus North America’s second largest river by 
discharge,16 the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system is one of the 
world’s mightiest and most important freshwater systems.  The 
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin is also home to six of the United 
States’ fifty-one largest metropolitan areas and eleven of Canada’s 
twenty largest population centers, including its two largest, Toronto 
and Montreal.  The volume of water in the lakes constitutes 
approximately 20% of the world’s fresh surface water and 95% of 
the fresh surface water in the forty-eight contiguous states.17  But 
they are more than a reservoir of freshwater for human 
consumption.  The Great Lakes are also an extraordinary scenic, 
aesthetic, recreational, commercial, and ecological resource, a true 
“inland sea” extending deep into the industrial and agricultural 
heartlands of both the United States and Canada, a region of some 
forty million people.18 
 
 
 15.  Lake Superior is the largest of the Great Lakes and the world’s second 
largest lake, Lake Huron is the world’s fourth largest, and Lake Michigan is fifth.  
Lake Erie is thirteenth, and Lake Ontario is seventeenth.  About Our Great Lakes: 
Lake by Lake Profiles, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.: GREAT LAKES ENVTL. 
RES. LABORATORY, http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/pr/ourlakes/lakes.html (last visited 
January 25, 2013).  The Caspian Sea is considerably larger than Lake Superior, but 
geologically it is considered a small ocean, an isolated remnant of the much larger 
global ocean of which it was once a contiguous part. 
 16.  The Mississippi-Missouri River discharges about fifty percent more water 
into the Gulf of Mexico than the St. Lawrence discharges into the North Atlantic.  
See FIELD GUIDE TO RIVERS OF NORTH AMERICA 3 tbl.1 (Arthur C. Behnke & Colbert 
E. Cushing eds., 2010) (listing the Mississippi as the largest North American river 
by discharge at 18,400 cubic meters per second and the St. Lawrence second at 
12,600 cubic meters per second).   
 17.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-515, GREAT LAKES: AN 
OVERALL STRATEGY AND INDICATORS FOR MEASURING PROGRESS ARE NEEDED TO 
BETTER ACHIEVE RESTORATION GOALS 11 (2003). 
 18.  See id. at 38; Susan H. MacKenzie, Toward Integrated Resource Management: 
Lessons About the Ecosystem Approach from the Laurentian Great Lakes, 21 ENVTL. MGMT. 
173, 174 (1997). 
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 Yet the Great Lakes are also a deeply stressed and a deeply 
challenged resource.  Lake Erie was famously written off as “dead” 
in the 1960s and early 1970s, the victim of eutrophication so severe 
that it was choking off aquatic life.19  Many believed it would never 
recover, and Lake Michigan and Lake Ontario were thought to be 
headed down the same path.20  Strong measures to clean up the 
largest pollution inputs—municipal sewage and industrial 
outfalls—have led to marked improvements in water quality and 
partial restoration of fish populations.  The Lakes nonetheless 
remain highly stressed by excessive nutrient loads; festering toxic 
“hotspots” in harbors and near-historic industrial outfalls; and 
biological pollution in the form of invasive exotic species carried in 
with ships’ ballast water or infiltrating through rivers and canals, 
displacing native species and disrupting the food webs and 
ecological relationships that define aquatic life in the Great Lakes.21 
Together, the United States and Canada have put in place 
some institutions and some important agreements, beginning with 
the Boundary Waters Treaty,22 which committed the parties to 
observe freedom of navigation and commerce in the Great Lakes 
and other boundary waters;23 to regulate obstructions, diversions, 
and artificial elevations or diminutions of natural lake levels;24 and 
to resolve management questions and disputes amicably.25  Toward 
 
 19.  RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 224, 415 n.36 (1999) 
(attributing the statement to biologist and environmental advocate Barry 
Commoner and stating that it was widely cited in the popular media in the late 
1960s); DAVE DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK:  THE GREAT LAKES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 113–
15 (2004) [hereinafter DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK]; DAVE DEMPSEY, RUIN & RECOVERY: 
MICHIGAN’S RISE AS A CONSERVATION LEADER 248 (2001) [hereinafter DEMPSEY, RUIN 
& RECOVERY] (stating that Life magazine declared Lake Erie “dead” in the 1960s).  
 20.  See DEMPSEY, RUIN & RECOVERY, supra note 19, at 249 (stating that 
Newsweek magazine announced a “death watch” for Lake Michigan in 1967). 
 21.  See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: 
Lessons from the Great Lakes, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 209, 215–18 
(2006) and sources cited therein (cataloging environmental problems in the Great 
Lakes).  
 22.  Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 3. 
 23.  Id. art. I. 
 24.  Id. art. III (prohibiting uses, obstructions, or diversions that alter natural 
levels except as authorized by the International Joint Commission).  
 25.  See id. pmbl. (stating that the parties are “equally desirous to prevent 
disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions which are 
now pending between the United States and the Dominion of Canada involving 
the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to the 
inhabitants of the other, along their common frontier, and to make provision for 
the adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise”). 
6
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that end, the Treaty established the International Joint 
Commission (IJC),26 a remarkable binational institution 
empowered to make regulatory decisions over certain proposed 
actions affecting the boundary waters,27 to investigate and make 
recommendations to the governments on questions they refer to it 
(“references”),28 and to arbitrate disputes.29 
The Boundary Waters Treaty is a prime example of public 
international law in its classical Westphalian sense: a contractual 
undertaking freely entered by autonomous and, in principle, equal 
national sovereigns, setting forth a series of mutual inter-sovereign 
obligations.  Perhaps the most striking innovation in the Boundary 
Waters Treaty, however, was the creation of a genuinely binational 
institution, the IJC, to act as an independent and impartial 
umpire—not merely a political or diplomatic forum for the 
principals to negotiate, but within its areas of jurisdiction, an 
independent decision maker in its own right, as well as an 
independent adviser to the governments.30  Creation of the IJC was 
a bold and visionary step.  Sovereign nations are typically loath to 
surrender actual decision-making authority to anyone, let alone an 
independent binational (or multi-national) commission, and few 
sovereigns are more reluctant on this score than the United States. 
 The Boundary Waters Treaty is widely celebrated for 
establishing the IJC.  Less widely appreciated is that the Boundary 
Waters Treaty was one of the world’s first treaties to squarely 
 
 26.  Id. art. VII (creating the IJC composed of six members, three appointed 
by the President of the United States and three appointed by the British Crown on 
the recommendation of the Governor in Council of Canada). 
 27.  Id. art. VIII (authorizing the IJC to regulate uses, obstructions, and 
diversions, and setting out a priority of uses to be followed by the IJC). 
 28.  Id. art. IX (committing the Parties to refer “questions or matters of 
difference arising between them” to the IJC, which is empowered to “examine into 
and report upon the facts and circumstances of the particular questions and 
matters referred, together with such conclusions and recommendations as may be 
appropriate”). 
 29.  Id. art. X (providing that by mutual consent the Parties may refer “[a]ny 
questions or matters of difference” to the IJC “for decision” by majority vote of the 
Commission). 
 30.  The six IJC Commissioners are appointed by the national governments, 
three per side, but by tradition Commissioners exercise independent judgment on 
behalf of the Commission and not as representatives of their respective 
governments.  See LEE BOTTS & PAUL MULDOON, EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES 
WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT 11–13 (2006) (describing the Commissioners’ 
tradition of independent, objective judgment not beholden to nationalistic 
concerns); DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK, supra note 19, at 244–45. 
7
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address transboundary pollution,31 and thus it represents a major 
precursor to modern international environmental law.  Tucked 
into Article IV of the Treaty is this simple yet sweeping 
commitment: “It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as 
boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not 
be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the 
other.”32 
With that simple bilateral commitment, the United States and 
Canada embraced a mutual obligation to prevent significant harm 
by transboundary pollution—the first clear expression in treaty law 
of the great principle of state responsibility to prevent serious 
transboundary environmental harm.  That principle would later 
find embodiment in the celebrated Trail Smelter arbitration,33 which 
in turn would lend its name to the Trail Smelter principle, widely 
considered a cornerstone of the customary international law of the 
environment.34 
Notwithstanding the brave words and bold vision of the 
Boundary Waters Treaty, however, transboundary pollution control 
remained a minor concern of the governments of the United States 
and Canada throughout the early decades of the twentieth century.  
An exhaustive IJC investigation of waterborne diseases, begun in 
 
 31.  See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues 
and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 675 (1993) (describing the 
pollution provision of the Boundary Waters Treaty as a “dramatic exception” to 
the typical treaties of its day which addressed water allocation, navigation, and 
fishing to the exclusion of environmental concerns); see also Ludwik A. Teclaff & 
Eileen Teclaff, International Control of Cross-Media Pollution—An Ecosystem Approach, 
27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 24 & nn.13–14 (1987) (discussing the 1909 Boundary 
Waters Treaty and the 1904 Franco-Swiss Convention for the Regulation of Fishing 
of Frontier Waters as early bilateral agreements addressing transboundary 
pollution). 
 32.  Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV. 
 33.  Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).  The Trail 
Smelter case involved damage to crops, orchards, and forests in the State of 
Washington from sulfur oxide fumes emanating from a Canadian lead and zinc 
smelter.  The arbitral tribunal held that “no State has the right to use or permit 
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the 
territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of 
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing 
evidence.”  Id. at 1965. 
 34.  See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental 
Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 44–45 (1997) (describing 
“the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas—use your property in such a manner 
so as not to injure another” as “the most basic and widely accepted traditional 
principle” of customary international environmental law and the basis for the 
decision in the Trail Smelter case).  
8
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1912 on a reference from the governments, ended in sweeping IJC 
recommendations for pollution control measures in 1918, but 
these recommendations were never acted upon by the 
governments.35 
When the Treaty finally did prompt some action in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, however, its impact was great.  In 
response to a 1946 reference, a 1950 IJC report recommended 
“urgent action” to address rising pollution levels in the St. Mary’s, 
St. Clair, Detroit, and Niagara Rivers and in Lake St. Clair.36  The 
IJC report led to the adoption of significant monitoring and 
pollution abatement measures on both sides of the border,37 
measures that have been called “the first of their kind on an 
international basis.”38  One commentator has argued that these 
early water quality standards were the main progenitors of what 
became the principal pollution abatement programs of both the 
United States and Canada.39  If that analysis is correct, then the 
seemingly modest and long-ignored little pollution control 
provision in the Boundary Waters Treaty might be seen as a 
progenitor of nothing less than the Clean Water Act on the one 
hand, and modern international environmental law on the other. 
But perhaps the greatest contribution of the Boundary               
Waters Treaty to the development of environmental law                     
came through its direct progeny, the Great Lakes Water                                              
Quality Agreement (GLWQA),40 first adopted in                                                   
 
 35.  See DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK, supra note 19, at 98–99.  
 36.  BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 13. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id.; see also Don Munton, Dependence and Interdependence in Transboundary 
Environmental Relations, 36 INT’L J. 139, 159 (1980–81) (stating that the Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement “represented both a significant innovation in the 
bilateral relationship” between the U.S. and Canada and “a unique achievement in 
international politics” insofar as it created a joint board to coordinate national 
pollution control programs and to monitor and report independently on the 
condition of the aquatic resource). 
 39.  Don Munton, Great Lakes Water Quality: A Study in Environmental Politics 
and Diplomacy, in RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR 
CANADA 153, 155 (O.P. Dwivedi ed., 1980).  
 40.  Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 
U.S.T. 301 [hereinafter GLWQA].  The 1972 agreement was superseded by a 
subsequent instrument, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, done 
at Ottawa on November 22, 1978, which in turn was amended on October 16, 
1983, and November 18, 1987.  See infra notes 59, 66 and accompanying text.  The 
most recent iteration is the Great Lakes Water Quality Protocol of 2012, signed by 
the United States and Canada in Washington on September 7, 2012, which 
amends the 1978 Agreement, as amended.  See infra note 70 and accompanying 
9
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197241 and amended at intervals in subsequent years.42  For both the 
United States and Canada, the GLWQA represented their first 
major foray into modern international environmental law.  There 
had, of course, been bilateral, regional, and multilateral 
agreements on wildlife and other natural resources prior to 1972,43 
and in limited ways, pollution control had also begun to creep into 
international law well before the 1970s—for example, through the 
Trail Smelter arbitration and the pollution control provision of the 
Boundary Waters Treaty itself.  But the GLWQA was a new breed of 
agreement—a binational agreement dedicated exclusively to 
pollution control in a transboundary setting.44 
At first, the GLWQA was understood as simply a subsidiary 
agreement in furtherance of the Boundary Waters Treaty’s 
Article IV pollution control provision.  Under that provision, in 
1964 the IJC undertook a reference on pollution in Lake Erie—an 
issue of rising public concern in the wake of visible, rapidly 
worsening, and widely publicized eutrophication.45  While the IJC 
investigation was ongoing, the public’s attention was riveted by 
Great Lakes beach closures, a fire that broke out on Cleveland’s 
Cuyahoga River, and a massive alewife die-off in Lake Michigan, as 
well as reports of plans for oil drilling on the bed of Lake Erie 
surfacing shortly after the disastrous 1969 oil spill in California’s 
Santa Barbara Channel, perhaps the first major environmental 
disaster to be viewed by millions on television.46 
The IJC assembled panels of experts, investigated, held public 
 
text. 
 41.  BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 1.  
 42.  The Agreement was amended in 1978 and a Protocol was attached in 
1987.  Id. at 51, 89.  
 43.  See, e.g., Convention Between the United States and Great Britain (for 
Canada) for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 
Stat. 1702. 
 44.  A handful of earlier agreements, all of them European, had tackled 
transboundary water pollution in regional settings, but the earlier agreements 
were generally limited to setting up institutions to arrange for research, conduct 
fact-finding, and make advisory recommendations to governments.  See C.B. 
Bourne, International Law and Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes, 6 U. BRIT. 
COLUM. L. REV. 115, 131–32 (1971).  For example, the International Commission 
for Protection of the Rhine was established by treaty in 1950 to arrange for 
research into Rhine pollution and to make recommendations to Rhine basin 
governments, but specific pollution control objectives were not specified for the 
Rhine by international agreement until 1976.  PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 243 (2d ed. 2002). 
 45.  See DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK, supra note 19, at 123–25. 
 46.  See BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 14. 
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hearings, and issued its final report on Lake Erie eutrophication in 
1970, urging new and more detailed water quality objectives and 
pollution control measures.47  Acknowledging that existing levels of 
pollution were incompatible with their commitments under the 
Boundary Waters Treaty, the governments convened a working 
group that negotiated the first GLWQA, completing its work in 
1972.48 
As a formal matter, the GLWQA was and remains an executive 
agreement implementing Article IV of the Boundary Waters 
Treaty.49  But it has also taken on a life of its own as our oldest, and 
in some ways most durable, international environmental 
agreement.  Its initial goal was narrowly conceived: to restore and 
enhance “water quality in the Great Lakes system” by establishing 
water quality standards for nutrients; toxic substances; materials 
that produce colors, odors, or other nuisance-like effects; “floating 
debris, oil, scum and other floating materials”; and “substances 
that . . . settle to form putrescent or otherwise objectionable sludge 
deposits.”50  But the principal focus of pollution control efforts was 
on phosphorus, which had been identified as the main culprit in 
Lake Erie eutrophication.51  The GLWQA was originally 
understood, then, as a simple pollution control agreement, 
motivated principally by a concern about phosphorus, the 
dominant pollution threat in the Great Lakes of the 1960s and 
1970s and still a critically important one, but only one in what is 
now understood to be a much broader suite of stressors on the 
aquatic environment of the Great Lakes. 
It quickly became apparent, however, that the 1972 GLWQA 
was too narrowly drawn.  Phosphorus pollution in Lake Erie was 
reduced quickly and sharply with the construction of modern 
sewage treatment plants and the adoption of limitations on the use 
of phosphates in detergents, but the environmental problems 
confronting the Great Lakes turned out to be both more numerous 
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 15. 
 49.  See GLWQA, supra note 40, art. VI (stating that the IJC “shall assist in the 
implementation” of the GLWQA and specifying the IJC’s implementation 
responsibilities pursuant to Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty); id. art. XI 
(“Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to diminish the rights and 
obligations of the Parties as set forth in the Boundary Waters Treaty.”). 
 50.  Id. pmbl. & art. II. 
 51.  BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 27. 
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and more complex than the original GLWQA had contemplated.52  
Research conducted in the 1970s pointed to new problems—
concentrated “hotspots” of toxic contaminants in ports and at 
industrial outfalls, the buildup of bioaccumulative toxins in the 
flesh of fish and other aquatic life, airborne deposition of 
pollutants, and the contributions of nonpoint pollution sources 
along the shores of the Great Lakes and far inland along their 
tributaries.53 
The 1972 Agreement had also set in motion processes that 
mounted pressure for change.  By the terms of the 1972 
Agreement, the IJC was to report periodically on progress toward 
the Agreement’s water quality objectives and make 
recommendations to the governments.54  This built on the IJC’s 
role as independent and impartial adviser to the governments, but 
at the same time partially transformed the IJC into an independent 
“watchdog” accountability mechanism in the pollution control 
arena.  The original Agreement also committed the governments to 
undertake a five-year review of the Agreement’s effectiveness with 
an eye toward making such revisions as would be necessary55—thus 
setting in motion a dynamic, iterative, rolling review and revision 
process, not only of the Agreement’s overall goals and objectives 
but also of the management approaches and institutional 
arrangements that might be necessary to achieve environmental 
improvements.  Finally, among the institutional arrangements that 
emerged out of the 1972 Agreement were several that dramatically 
opened the process to citizen participation.56 
In 1978, the governments adopted an amended GLWQA, 
 
 52.  See id. at 52–57 (stating that scientists identified PCBs and other 
bioaccumulative toxic pollutants, nonpoint source pollution, airborne deposition 
of pollutants, and other threats to the Great Lakes ecosystem). 
 53.  See id. at 54–58. 
 54.  GLWQA, supra note 40, art. VI, § 3 (mandating that the IJC report to the 
Parties and governments on progress toward meeting water quality objectives and 
effectiveness of programs and measures, and offer its recommendations); id. 
art.   IX, § 1 (mandating that the Parties consult on IJC reports and 
recommendations submitted under Article VI, section 3, and that they consider 
modifications of water quality objectives, programs and measures, and the 
Agreement, as appropriate). 
 55.  Id. art. IX, § 3 (mandating that the Parties conduct a “comprehensive 
review” of the Agreement during its fifth year in force). 
 56.  See BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 39–44 (describing the 
emergence of environmental organizations, coupled with enhanced opportunities 
for public participation in proceedings of the IJC and other Great Lakes 
institutions). 
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going beyond the 1972 Agreement both in the scope and nature of 
the problems to be addressed and in the means to be used to 
address them.57  At the urging of the IJC’s Great Lakes Research 
Advisory Board, the 1978 Agreement introduced the concept of an 
ecosystem approach to management,58 with the ambitious aim to 
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem,” as well 
as to “eliminate [toxic] pollutants.”59  This was the first time an 
international agreement of any kind had embraced an “ecosystem 
approach” and such a sweeping, multi-faceted ecological 
restoration goal60—although some commentators have suggested 
the implications of this language may not have been fully 
appreciated by all participants in the negotiating sessions that led 
to the adoption of the 1978 Agreement.61 
The ecosystem approach articulated in the 1978 amendments 
to the GLWQA would later be emulated in subsequent natural 
resource management regimes elsewhere in the United States62 and 
Canada,63 internationally,64 and globally.65  Once again, the Great 
 
 57.  See id. at 51–52 (stating that the 1978 Agreement embraced new goals, 
including an “ecosystem approach” and “virtual elimination” of toxic pollutants); 
id. at 66–69 (stating that the adoption of an ecosystem approach and the goal of 
virtual elimination of toxics necessitated a broadening of management efforts to 
address non-chemical stressors, tributary waters, land use impacts on ecosystem 
health, contaminated sediments, and airborne deposition of pollutants). 
 58.  See DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK, supra note 19, at 188–91. 
 59.  Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., art. II, Nov. 22, 
1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383. 
 60.  Ludwik A. Teclaff, Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and 
International Water Law, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 359, 378 & n.111, 379 (1996) (noting 
that although the Stockholm Declaration called for audits of development projects 
in “representative ecosystems of international significance,” the 1978 GLWQA was 
the first instrument to call for an “ecosystem approach” to natural resource 
management). 
 61.  BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 63.  
 62.  See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, http://www.chesapeakebay.net (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2013); Everglades Restoration, FLA. DEPARTMENT ENVTL. PROTECTION, 
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/everglades/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
 63.  See, e.g., FISHERIES & OCEANS CAN., PACIFIC NORTH COAST INTEGRATED 
MANAGEMENT AREA: AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH 2–4, available at http://www.pac.dfo   
-mpo.gc.ca/publications/pdfs/pncima-eng.pdf (describing an “integrated, 
ecosystem approach” to managing British Columbia’s Queen Charlotte Basin in 
the North Pacific, and stating that “[t]his is consistent with the Government of 
Canada’s overall direction and with Fisheries and Oceans Canada’s new Wild 
Salmon Policy”). 
 64.  See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea Area, Apr. 9, 1992, art. III, subdiv. 1 (entered into force Jan. 17, 2000), 
available at http://www.helcom.fi/Convention/en_GB/text/ (stating an 
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Lakes regime spawned by the Boundary Waters Treaty proved to be 
an innovator and pacesetter for the world community. 
The broad ecosystem restoration goals enunciated in the 
revised 1978 Agreement were largely kept intact when a new 1987 
Protocol was negotiated,66 and these goals remain foundational to 
the Great Lakes management regime today.  But the 1987 Protocol 
added several important wrinkles.  First, in recognition of the 
important role of airborne deposition of pollutants, air pollution 
control was explicitly added to the Agreement’s list of objectives.67  
Second, while maintaining overall basin-wide ecosystem restoration 
goals, the parties committed to develop Remedial Action Plans for 
identified “areas of concern” (toxic hotspots) throughout the Great 
Lakes Basin and launched a process to develop management plans 
at the level of the individual lakes.68  The 1987 Protocol thus 
incorporated an innovative “nested” management scheme at 
multiple interconnected scales, another important innovation and 
one more significant evolutionary step in the iterative unfolding of 
Great Lakes governance.69 
A recently adopted 2012 Protocol makes additional 
commitments.70  It expressly recognizes aquatic invasive species, 
discharges from ships, climate change, and habitat and species loss 
 
overarching goal to “promote the ecological restoration of the Baltic Sea Area and 
the preservation of its ecological balance”). 
 65.  See, e.g., Teclaff, supra note 60.  
 66.  Protocol Amending the 1978 Agreement Between the United States and 
Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, as Amended on October 16, 1983, U.S.-
Can., Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11,551 [hereinafter 1987 Protocol].   
 67.  Id. art. XIX (adding a new Annex 15 to commit the Parties to research, 
surveillance, monitoring, and control measures on airborne toxic pollutants). 
 68.  Id. art. VIII (amending Annex 2 to commit the Parties to undertake 
Remedial Action Plans for designated Areas of Concern and to develop and 
implement Lakewide Management Plans for each of the Great Lakes). 
 69.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY: GREAT LAKES NAT’L PROGRAM OFFICE, GREAT 
LAKES ECOSYSTEM REPORT 2000, at E-1 (2001) (describing the Great Lakes Program 
as a “nested structure . . . meant to parallel the natural boundaries found in the 
Great Lakes ecosystem: from local landscapes to sub-watersheds, to individual lake 
basins, to the entire Great Lakes Basin”); Henry A. Regier, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
River Basin Assessments: Case Study, in BIOREGIONAL ASSESSMENTS: SCIENCE AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 135, 138 (K. Norman Johnson et al. eds., 
1999) (“[T]he bioregional assessment process has self-organized into an implicit 
three-level holarchy.”). 
 70.  Protocol Amending the Agreement Between Canada and the United 
States of America on Great Lakes Water Quality, 1978, as Amended on October 
16, 1983 and on November 18, 1987, U.S.-Can., Sept. 7, 2012 [hereinafter 2012 
Protocol]. 
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as priority concerns71 and places special emphasis on restoration 
and maintenance of nearshore areas, where stressors tend to be 
greatest.72  The governments pledge to adopt common objectives, 
to implement cooperative programs, and to involve key subnational 
actors including states, provinces, municipalities, Tribal 
Governments, First Nations, watershed management agencies, and 
the public in Great Lakes management and restoration.73  The 
parties promise heightened transparency and accountability 
through adoption of specific objectives for each lake and at basin-
wide scales,74 coupled with enhanced monitoring and reporting 
requirements.75  They pledge to use an adaptive management 
approach.76  The 2012 Protocol contemplates an enhanced role for 
 
 71.  See id. app., pmbl., cl. 4 (“[e]mphasizing the need to strengthen efforts to 
address new and continuing threats . . . , including aquatic invasive species, 
nutrients, chemical substances, discharge from vessels, the climate change 
impacts, and the loss of habitats and species”); see also id. annex 5 (discharges from 
vessels); id. annex 6 (aquatic invasive species); id. annex 7 (habitat and species); 
id. annex 8 (groundwater); id. annex 9 (climate change impacts). 
 72.  Id. app., pmbl., cl. 7 (“[r]ecognizing that nearshore areas must be 
restored and protected because they are the major source of drinking water for 
communities within the basin, are where most human commerce and recreation 
occurs, and are the critical ecological link between watersheds and the open 
waters of the Great Lakes”). 
 73.  Id. app., art. 3, § 1(a) (adopting common General Objectives); id. app., 
art. 3, § 1(b) (committing the parties to consult and cooperate with state and 
provincial governments, tribes, First Nations, Métis, municipal governments, 
watershed management agencies, other local public agencies, downstream 
jurisdictions, and the public to identify and work to attain Specific Objectives, 
including lake ecosystem objectives and substance objectives); id. app., art. 4 
(committing the parties to develop and adopt implementation programs and 
measures in cooperation and consultation with the same various persons and 
institutions).  
 74.  Id. app., art. 3, § 1(b)(i)(A) (committing to the establishment of 
binational lake ecosystem objectives, except for Lake Michigan which lies wholly 
within the United States); id. app., art. 3, § 1(b)(ii) (committing to the 
establishment of basinwide substance objectives).  
 75.  Id. app., art. 3, § 3 (monitoring); id. app., art. 3, § 4 (reporting).  The 
various annexes also include issue-specific monitoring and reporting 
requirements.  See, e.g., id. app., annex 4(E)–(F) (establishing monitoring and 
reporting requirements for nutrients); id. app., annex 6(B)–(D) (establishing 
monitoring, surveillance, assessment, and reporting requirements for aquatic 
invasive species).  
 76.  Id. app., art. 2, § 4(b) (committing the parties to be “guided by” 
principles of adaptive management, “implementing a systematic process by which 
the Parties assess effectiveness of actions and adjust future actions to achieve the 
objectives of this Agreement, as outcomes and ecosystem processes become better 
understood”). 
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the International Joint Commission77 and its subsidiary bodies, 
including the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, Great Lakes 
Science Advisory Board, and Great Lakes Regional Office,78 though 
the IJC’s role remains largely one of information gathering and 
advising.  Indeed, the 2012 Protocol underscores that operational 
responsibility for implementation of all these commitments 
remains the sole responsibility of the national governments; both 
the IJC and subnational actors are relegated to an advisory and 
consultative role.79 
Without question, the Boundary Waters Treaty and its 
progeny, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, have been 
profoundly influential, both within the Great Lakes Basin and 
beyond.  They serve as cornerstones of the larger U.S.-Canadian 
relationship, and time and again they have served as early 
prototypes and innovative models for what have become widely 
adopted principles and approaches embraced in both national and 
international law.  They represent, in important ways, the best that 
international law, and especially international environmental law, 
has achieved. 
And yet there is a certain irony to that characterization.  For at 
the end of the day, even the most enthusiastic proponents of these 
arrangements concede that, in practice, they have often fallen 
short of their lofty ambitions.  As innovative and visionary as the 
GLWQA has been—and as much as it has inspired its own imitators 
elsewhere—it has largely been a failure if measured by its concrete 
achievements since its early success in reducing phosphorus levels.  
The Great Lakes are still under enormous stress, and progress 
toward addressing those stressors has been in most areas painfully 
 
 77.  Id. app., art. 7, § 1(a)–(o) (assigning IJC responsibilities for, inter alia, 
analyzing and disseminating data and information, tendering advice and 
recommendations to the parties, providing assistance to the parties as requested in 
coordinating their joint activities, assisting in and advising on scientific matters, 
investigating subjects referred to it by the parties, consulting with the public, and 
raising public awareness). 
 78.  Id. app., art. 8 (calling on the IJC to create a Great Lakes Water Quality 
Board, a Great Lakes Science Advisory Board, and a Great Lakes Regional Office, 
and defining the responsibilities of each body). 
 79.  See id. app., art. 3, § 2 (“The Parties shall progress toward the attainment 
of these General Objectives, Lake Ecosystem Objectives and Substance Objectives 
through their respective domestic programs.”); id. app., art. 4, § 1 (“The Parties, in 
cooperation and consultation with State and Provincial Governments, Tribal 
Governments, First Nations, Métis, Municipal Governments, watershed 
management agencies, other local public agencies, and the Public, shall develop 
and implement programs and other measures . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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slow, or even nonexistent. 
Some have argued that the governments of the United States 
and Canada made a strategic blunder—either that, or a shrewd but 
cynical calculated choice—when they decided to leave 
responsibility for implementing the GLWQA entirely in their own 
hands, declining to give the IJC or any other binational body 
implementation and operational authority over environmental 
matters.80  Instead, the IJC is left on the outside, with authority only 
to observe, investigate, report, offer criticism and suggestions, and 
jawbone as environmental problems in the Great Lakes Basin 
continue to get short shrift and as commitments nominally 
undertaken by the governments through the GLWQA go 
unfulfilled.  Arguably, had the governments vested authority in the 
IJC to make binding decisions on implementation measures, we 
might be farther down the road toward fulfilling the unmet 
promises of the 1978 GLWQA and its 1987 Protocol. 
An alternative hypothesis, equally plausible in my view, is that 
the failure of the GLWQA to get traction on the daunting 
environmental challenges of the Great Lakes reveals something 
deeper about the limits of international environmental law as a tool 
to address complex transboundary environmental and natural 
resource management problems.  That is to say, the situation in the 
Great Lakes region might best be understood not as a simple 
failure to implement ambitious bilateral agreements.  Maybe the 
more fundamental problem is that the nature of the instrument is 
poorly matched to the nature of the challenges involved.  The 
suggestion here is that a contractual agreement between two 
sovereign states is not the kind of instrument—and not the right 
kind of institutional arrangement—that can actually do something 
as complex and multidimensional as an “ecosystem approach to 
management,” especially at this large, basin-wide, regional scale, 
and most especially given the extraordinarily complex suite of 
resources and stressors that comprise the system. 
Perhaps the problem, in other words, is that international 
environmental law itself—as conventionally and classically 
understood, consisting of mutual contractual obligations freely 
undertaken between national sovereigns—is inadequate to the task 
 
 80.  See, e.g., Alisa Tschorke, Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: Is Honesty 
Without Accountability or Enforcement Still Enough?, 15 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
273, 287–99 (2008) (criticizing the GLWQA for failure to include public 
accountability and enforcement measures).     
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of managing as complex and multifaceted a transboundary 
resource as the Great Lakes.  On this view, the failure is not simply 
a failure to implement or perform on a contract; instead, the 
contractual approach itself is a flawed approach for the 
undertaking. 
If that is the case, then it is time to rethink the institutional 
arrangements from the ground up.  What is most striking about the 
GLWQA, in its many iterations, is the mismatch between its bold 
expression of intent to undertake an ecosystem approach and its 
almost total inattention to questions of institutional design; i.e., 
how would we go about putting in place the ongoing institutional 
arrangements that would be necessary to make an “ecosystem 
approach to management” actually happen?  It’s as if the drafters 
of that instrument believed that simply getting the governments to 
undertake a contractual commitment to an ecosystem approach 
would create enough normative pressure to cause them to take the 
hard follow-up steps of designing the institutional arrangements 
that would make an ecosystem approach possible and then 
executing that institutional design.  But that is an effort the 
governments have never even initiated in a serious way, despite the 
passage of more than three decades since the words “ecosystem 
approach” were first written into the contract. 
A moment’s reflection would suggest that integrated 
management of the entire suite of stressors and resources 
implicated in a genuine ecosystem approach would require the 
participation not only of the national governments but also of the 
states and provinces, which bring supplemental and in some cases 
unique capacities and competencies to the table, along with 
intimate familiarity with environmental, social, economic, and legal 
conditions in the Great Lakes Basin—and just possibly more 
political will than the national governments, which tend to see the 
Great Lakes as a regional and not a truly national concern, and 
consequently of secondary or tertiary importance.  Such an effort 
would probably need to include some local public authorities as 
well—major cities, port authorities, water and sewer districts, 
watershed management agencies, and the like.  It might need to 
include some intergovernmental organizations—the IJC, as well as 
the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, the Great Lakes Commission, 
and the Council of Great Lakes Governors.  It needs to include 
tribal and First Nations authorities.  It needs to find a way to 
integrate input from leading scientists familiar with the Basin or 
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whose work is directly relevant to the management challenges at 
hand.  To build legitimacy, transparency, and public support, it 
probably needs to include leading non-governmental organizations 
as well. 
At some level, these groups already talk to one another, and all 
are involved in one way or another with important aspects of Great 
Lakes governance.  But for all the hard work and good work that 
has gone into the Great Lakes over the past four decades, precious 
little has gone into actually thinking through the design of 
governance institutions that would be capable of making an 
ecosystem approach a reality, and not merely words on paper. 
II. THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT AND AGREEMENT:                  
TRANSBOUNDARY NORMATIVITY WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
Perhaps it is time to shift our focus away from thinking of 
management of the Great Lakes as an inter-national problem 
requiring an inter-national law solution—a binding contractual 
agreement between sovereign nation states.  That way of thinking 
may be an obstacle to progress at this point.  Instead, we might 
think of it as a transboundary problem, requiring a new form of 
effective transboundary governance, scaled to the resource we are 
trying to manage and protect.  In previous work I have labeled this 
a “post-sovereign” approach81—a provocative term, to be sure.  But 
by whatever label, the suggestion is that we need to look toward 
building a transboundary hybrid “new governance” arrangement 
tailored to the scope and nature of the resource, with the active 
participation of all the groups identified in the closing paragraphs 
of Part I of this article; not merely a sovereign-to-sovereign 
arrangement, but an ongoing institutional arrangement embracing 
subnational levels of government, as well as intergovernmental and 
a variety of nongovernmental actors—the relevant elements of civil 
society, if you will.  These types of “new governance” arrangements 
are actually becoming quite common in Europe and here and 
there in the United States, and they have spawned a robust 
literature of their own.82 
 
 81.  See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance, 
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Feb. 2004, at 72. 
 82.  See, e.g., LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne de 
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); David M. 
Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: 
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Such a hybrid new governance arrangement might prove 
capable of making good on the promise of an ecosystem approach  
in the Great Lakes Basin—or anywhere, for that matter.  All the 
elements for such an arrangement already exist in the Great Lakes 
region; it’s just that, whether by inattention or by design, the parts 
have never been assembled into a working whole. 
The suggestion is not that this sort of institutional 
arrangement is an easy thing to build; far from it.  But many people 
have been lulled into passivity by what has turned out to be the 
false promise of the GLWQA that an ecosystem approach would be 
implemented by the national governments.  And when the 
governments have failed to deliver on that promise (for 
understandable reasons, because they have never had the vision, 
the blueprint, or, most importantly, the incentives to make it 
actually happen), they have failed to hold each other accountable, 
and no one else has stepped forward to take their place.  Why?  
Well, in part because key actors in the Great Lakes Basin continue 
to accept the notion that management of the Great Lakes is 
primarily a binational or international problem, something for the 
national sovereigns to work out. 
There are alternative models.  Increasingly, the Europeans 
appear willing to bracket the formalities of national sovereign 
prerogative in the interest of devising pragmatic solutions to thorny 
transboundary problems, including environmental and natural 
resource management problems.  They are doing it in the context 
of managing the Baltic Sea, a large enclosed sea not unlike the 
Great Lakes in many respects (apart from the fact that the Baltic is 
saline).  The management effort there got started a bit later than 
with the Great Lakes but has far surpassed efforts in the Great 
Lakes in the sophistication and functionality of its transboundary 
institutional arrangements and in the progress it has made towards 
achieving environmental improvement goals.  The Europeans are 
also increasingly proceeding down this path in the context of 
transboundary integrated river basin management under the EU 
Water Framework Directive.  A prime example is the Danube River 
basin, which traverses some eighteen nations from its source in 
Germany’s Black Forest to its outlet at the Black Sea in Romania, 
but is now managed under a joint management regime.83  In these 
 
The Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination, 11 EUR. L.J. 343 (2005). 
 83.  See Alistair S. Rieu-Clarke, An Overview of Stakeholder Participation—What 
Current Practice and Future Challenges?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 611, 618–
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and other places, real transboundary “new governance” institutions 
are being built, and they are achieving real results. 
The Europeans have come to realize that these complex 
problems cannot be addressed simply by treaty—that is, by inter-
sovereign contracts and mutually binding obligations at a nation-to-
nation level.  Treaties often continue to play a role in establishing 
the institutional framework; the Helsinki Convention on the 
Protection of the Baltic Sea84 and the Danube River Protection 
Convention,85 for example, establish far-reaching substantive goals 
and objectives, but they also create permanent regional institutions, 
recognizing that the real work and the hard management decisions 
need to take place closer to the ground, by people who are 
empowered to act on behalf of, and at the scale of, the resource 
being managed.  There is a continued role for national sovereigns 
and international law, to be sure.  But their role is no longer to 
claim exclusive authority; it is to authorize and empower new 
transboundary institutions, and to legitimize their actions with the 
mantle of legality. 
The recently adopted Great Lakes Water Resource Compact 
and Sustainable Water Resources Agreement on water allocation 
hint at the institutional possibilities in the Great Lakes Basin.  
These instruments are aimed at the rather modest goal of limiting 
out-of-basin diversions of water from the Great Lakes Basin.86  More 
specifically, the legally binding Compact among the eight Great 
Lakes Basin states, and its mirror-image companion document, the 
good-faith Agreement between the same eight states and two 
Canadian provinces, provide for: 
 A ban on new out-of-basin diversions,87 subject to narrowly 
 
19 (2007) (describing requirements of the EU Water Framework Directive and 
stating that the states have designated the International Commission for the 
Protection of the Danube River as the “competent authority for overseeing the 
implementation of the Directive”). 
 84.  Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic 
Sea Area, supra note 64.  
 85.  Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of 
the Danube River, June 29, 1994 (entered into force Oct. 22, 1998), available at 
http://www.icpdr.org/main/icpdr/danube-river-protection-convention.  
 86.  See A. Dan Tarlock, The International Joint Commission and Great Lakes 
Diversions: Indirectly Extending the Reach of the Boundary Waters Treaty, 54 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1671, 1673 (2008) (stating that the Compact, which makes it difficult to 
divert water from the Great Lakes Basin, arose in reaction to “proposed or possible 
projects to divert the Lakes’ water to the more arid regions of the United States or 
undisclosed water-short countries”).  
 87.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.8; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 200(1). 
21
Karkkainen: The Great Lakes Water Resources Compact and Agreement: Transbound
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
1018 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:3 
limited exceptions for “straddling” communities that are partly 
within the basin and partly outside it and for certain intra-
basin transfers (e.g., a diversion from the watershed of one 
Great Lake to the watershed of another Great Lake).88 
 Establishment of uniform regional standards for evaluating 
and permitting proposed water withdrawals and consumptive 
uses,89 including requirements that return flows shall be to the 
source watershed,90 no individual or cumulative adverse 
impacts on water quality or quantity shall be permitted,91 all 
withdrawals and consumptive uses must be implemented so as 
to incorporate environmentally sound and economically 
feasible water conservation measures,92 and each permitted 
withdrawal or consumptive use shall be “reasonable” as 
determined by reference to a multi-factor balancing test set 
out in the Compact and Agreement.93 
 Requirements that each state (and province) develop a 
comprehensive water resources inventory and contribute to a 
common database on water resources and withdrawals,94 adopt 
a state or provincial water management conservation and 
efficiency plan and submit it for regional review,95 establish a 
program to prohibit new diversions and regulate water 
withdrawals and consumptive uses in accordance with basin-
wide standards set forth in the Compact and Agreement,96 and 
report at five-year intervals on how the Compact and 
Agreement are being implemented in each respective 
jurisdiction.97 
 Establishment of a regional governing body called the Great 
Lakes Water Resources Council, consisting of the governors of 
each of the states (or their representatives),98 and a parallel 
 
 88.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1)–(2); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 201. 
 89.  Compact, supra note 7, §§ 4.10–.11; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203, 
206. 
 90.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.11(1); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203(1). 
 91.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.11(2); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203(2). 
 92.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.11(3); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203(3). 
 93.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.11(5); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203(5). 
 94.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.1; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 301. 
 95.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.2(2); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 304. 
 96.  Compact, supra note 7, §§ 4.3(1), 4.10; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 200, 
206. 
 97.  Compact, supra note 7, § 3.4(1); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 300. 
 98.  See Compact, supra note 7, § 2.1 (establishing the Great Lakes-St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council). 
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body called the Regional Body, consisting of the governors 
and the premiers of the two provinces.99  The Council and 
Regional Body are to meet concurrently and are empowered 
to develop guidance and promulgate and enforce basin-wide 
regulations,100 to develop and implement region-wide water 
management conservation and efficiency plans,101 to review the 
water management plans and implementation reports of the 
basin states and provinces,102 to make recommendations to the 
states and provinces regarding implementation of the 
Compact and Agreement,103 and to exercise “regional review” 
permitting authority over proposed withdrawals or diversions 
deemed to be of region-wide significance or of precedent-
setting character.104 
The Compact and Agreement apply not only to water within 
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River proper, but to all surface 
water and groundwater within the basin.105  In a controversial 
compromise, the Compact and Agreement classify shipments of 
water out of the basin in containers of 5.7 gallons or less as not 
constituting “diversions.”106  Also exempted is the longstanding 
diversion at Chicago, which is governed by the United States 
Supreme Court’s decree in Wisconsin v. Illinois.107 
Some critics within the Great Lakes Basin question whether 
the instruments will be effective in achieving their stated goal.108  
 
 99.  See Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400 (establishing the Great Lakes-St. 
Lawrence River Water Resources Regional Body). 
 100.  See Compact, supra note 7, § 3.3 (empowering the Council to 
“promulgate and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the 
implementation and enforcement of this Compact”).  In contrast, the Regional 
Body is only given authority to “[d]evelop guidance for the implementation of the 
Standard and the Exception Standard.”  Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(2)(i). 
 101.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.2(1); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(2)(f).  
 102.  Compact, supra note 7, § 3.4(2); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(2)(c), 
(e). 
 103.  Compact, supra note 7, § 3.4(3); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(2)(h). 
 104.  Compact, supra note 7, §§ 4.5(1), 4.5(5); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 
400(2)(a)–(b), 500, 505.  
 105.  Compact, supra note 7, §§ 1.2, 4.2(1); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 103, 
304(1)(c). 
 106.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.12(10); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 207(9). 
 107.  Compact, supra note 7, § 4.14; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 207(10)–
(14); see Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930) (limiting diversion at the 
Chicago Drainage Canal to an average of 1500 cubic feet per second after 
December 31, 1938, and larger amounts during a transition period). 
 108.  See Mark Squillace, Rethinking the Great Lakes Compact, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1347, 1358–60 (arguing that the Compact focuses exclusively on new or 
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Other critics question the goal itself, arguing that locking up twenty 
percent of the world’s fresh surface water at a time of growing 
water shortages and an uncertain water future in the age of global 
climate change is a dubious undertaking.109  Both critiques raise 
important questions about the Compact and Agreement that are 
beyond the scope of this article.  Still others have suggested that the 
Compact and Agreement were put forth as a solution to a remote 
and speculative, or even non-existent, problem.110 
The focus here is not on the effectiveness of the Compact and 
Agreement themselves, nor on the wisdom of what these 
instruments are trying to achieve, but rather on what the Compact 
and Agreement represent as a novel kind of transboundary 
governance mechanism.  They provide a model in which the states 
and provinces did not wait for the national governments to act.  
Nor did the states and provinces assume that because questions of 
Great Lakes water allocation had a transboundary dimension, 
decisions about their management properly fell within the 
exclusive foreign affairs powers of their respective national 
governments.  Instead, the states and provinces seized the initiative 
and crafted their own solution—a Compact among the eight states 
that became legally binding by virtue of Congressional approval, 
and a legally non-binding but morally compelling parallel good-
faith Agreement between the eight U.S. states and two provinces, 
committing the two Canadian provinces to the exact same 
provisions to which the U.S. states are legally bound by the 
Compact and giving the provinces an equal seat at the table 
alongside the states in the regional governing body created by the 
instruments.  The Compact and Agreement are then given further 
legal and practical effect by legislative ratification in each state and 
province, coupled with implementing legislation in each state and 
 
increased withdrawals and diversions without addressing existing water uses in the 
basin, which are much larger and more significant); Amanda Peterka,                   
“Jury Is Out” on Implementation of Landmark Great Lakes Compact, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/07/14/14greenwire-jury-is-out-on               
-implementation-of-landmark-grea-33525.html (describing environmentalist 
critiques of state implementation of the Compact). 
 109.  See Squillace, supra note 108, at 1363–64 (questioning the ban on small-
scale out-of-basin diversions that cause no perceptible harm to the Great Lakes but 
may force out-of-basin communities in smaller watersheds to place greater 
demands on already-stressed water resources). 
 110.  See A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 369, 391 (2010) (stating that the Compact was a response to “remote or 
trivially possible . . . transbasin diversion threats”).  
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province to put the procedural and substantive commitments 
called for in the Compact and Agreement into effect.  Through this 
ingenious device, the effect of the Compact and Agreement is to 
create an actual transboundary governance regime, complete with 
real transboundary decision-making institutions and backed by the 
force of law in each of the states and provinces with a stake in the 
resource, each harmonizing its domestic laws with the common 
transboundary regulatory scheme. 
That all this could take place without a sovereign-to-sovereign 
international treaty specifically authorizing it might seem 
remarkable.  And so it is, but it gives us a sense of the possibilities.  
These transboundary governance arrangements do not fit the 
familiar contours of international law and international lawmaking.  
Yet neither are they unlawful, nor completely extra-lawful.  Indeed, 
on the U.S. side at least, they come now with the formal blessing of 
the federal government, in the form of congressional ratification of 
the Compact and acquiescence by silence with respect to the 
Agreement.  It suggests there is space for more of this sort of thing. 
A good thing, too, for when it comes to building effective 
transboundary governance institutions in the Great Lakes Basin, 
the initiative is not likely to come from Ottawa and Washington.  
The initiative is more likely to come from within the Basin, where 
the benefits of managing and protecting the Great Lakes are most 
keenly felt.  Formal sovereign ratification in the form of a new 
international agreement, if needed, can come later. 
III. THE LARGER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT    
AND AGREEMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN AND BEYOND 
The Compact and Agreement represent an interesting and 
novel model of transboundary governance of a natural system at a 
scale tailored to the system itself, initiated and maintained by 
subnational governments.  Yet while the institutional arrangements 
are bold and innovative in design, the purpose for which they are 
established is exceedingly narrow in scope. 
The Compact and Agreement also appear to operate wholly 
apart from the efforts of the national governments of the United 
States and Canada to manage the Great Lakes ecosystem through 
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.  As discussed in Part I, 
the latest iteration of the GLWQA, like its predecessors, is long on 
vision and ambition, but it suffers from a lack of appropriately 
scaled institutional infrastructure.  While the GLWQA anticipates 
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state, local, and tribal participation in Great Lakes ecosystem 
management, the role specified for these subnational actors is 
confined to advising and consulting the national decision makers.  
The example of the Compact and Agreement suggests not only that 
it is possible to design transboundary institutions for decision 
making at regional ecosystem scales, but that subnational 
governments are capable of participating as true decision makers, 
not just advisers.  The next logical stage in the evolution of Great 
Lakes ecosystem governance, then, is to design hybrid regionally 
scaled institutions that include both federal and state/provincial 
governments—as well as possibly others, such as local watershed 
management agencies, tribes, and First Nations—as co-decision 
makers, with the aim to integrate management of the entire suite 
of resources and stressors that comprise the Great Lakes.  Such an 
arrangement would in effect merge the functions of the GLWQA 
and the Compact and Agreement, and fuse the regional 
institutional skeleton created by the Compact and Agreement with 
the binational relationship and programmatic vision of the 
GLWQA. 
That sort of hybrid institutional mechanism is not likely to 
evolve organically out of either the present GLWQA or the 
Compact and Agreement.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how the 
national governments, operating through the GLWQA, could 
negotiate the terms of any such new arrangement on behalf of 
their respective subnational governments; and by the same token, 
the states and provinces, working within the framework of the 
Compact and Agreement, lack authority to negotiate on behalf of 
their respective national governments.  Yet over time the presence 
of effective regionally scaled governance institutions created by the 
Compact and Agreement could operate as both a model and as a 
spur to policymakers at both the national, regional, and 
state/provincial levels, inspiring them to explore governance 
possibilities beyond the traditional and familiar arrangements that 
to date have proven largely ineffective. 
What broader lessons can be drawn from the Great Lakes 
Compact and Agreement, beyond their implications for the Great 
Lakes Basin itself?  An obvious question is whether the governance 
model established by the Compact and Agreement is replicable 
outside the Great Lakes Basin.  There certainly are other important 
natural systems that straddle national boundaries, but at first blush 
it would appear that the Compact and Agreement model can be 
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effective only where all the relevant nations are federal systems.  It 
is not unusual for nations, especially large ones, to embrace some 
form of federalism, but neither is federalism a universal practice, 
and it is perhaps even rarer to find two federal systems operating 
side by side, like the United States and Canada.  Yet arguably it 
would be a mistake to take the federalism requirement too 
seriously.  Most political systems, federal and non-federal, vest some 
measure of decision-making autonomy in subnational 
governmental authorities.  The key fact about the Great Lakes 
states and provinces is perhaps not that they are states and 
provinces in federal systems, but that they are subnational 
governments with interests in a shared transboundary resource and 
have substantial authority over it.  Wherever those conditions 
obtain, some sort of transboundary governance mechanism at least 
loosely resembling the arrangements created by the Compact and 
Agreement is possible. 
A final observation concerns the contrast between binding law, 
on the one hand, and the moral force of a good-faith agreement, 
on the other.  Does it matter that the Compact among the eight 
U.S. states is legally binding, while the transboundary Agreement 
that brings in the two Canadian provinces is not?  Certainly as a 
formal matter it makes some difference.  Although all eight states 
have now ratified the Compact, all ten jurisdictions have embraced 
the Agreement, and all have incorporated the requirements of the 
Compact and Agreement into state or provincial legislation,111 it is, 
in principle, easier for a party to withdraw from the Agreement 
than from the Compact.  The Agreement itself specifies that any 
party may withdraw from the Agreement unilaterally upon written 
notice; in that case, the Agreement remains in force with respect to 
the remaining parties, unless terminated by written agreement of 
all remaining parties.  In contrast, the Compact purports to bind all 
parties until the Compact is terminated by a majority vote of all 
parties112 and provides for judicial review in the federal courts of 
 
 111. See id. at 391–92; see also GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER WATER RES. 
REG’L BODY & GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RES. COUNCIL, JOINT 
DECLARATION OF FINDING 4–5 (2010). 
 112.  Compact, supra note 7, § 8.7.  The default rule in the law of interstate 
compacts is that no party may renounce an interstate compact without the 
unanimous consent of all parties, absent a provision to the contrary in the 
compact itself.  See Herbert H. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements Between States and 
Between States and a Foreign Power, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 219, 227 (1952–53).  Generally, 
termination of a compact also requires unanimous consent of all parties, but 
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actions taken under the Compact, stating that the court may 
provide equitable relief or (unspecified) “civil penalties.”113  
Ultimately, however, it is probably not the threat of judicial 
enforcement but the good faith of the parties that will determine 
whether the Compact is effective; it is hard to imagine what judicial 
remedies would compel a recalcitrant state that no longer wanted 
to be part of the Compact to carry out its affirmative duties under 
that agreement effectively.  If that is the case, then the “legally 
binding” character of the Compact may be something of a mirage.  
Nor is it likely that the Compact regime could withstand persistent 
and substantial non-compliance by one or more parties.  To that 
extent, the success of the Compact, like that of the Agreement, is 
likely to turn more on the good faith of the parties than on the 
threat of legal enforcement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact and Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence River Basin Sustainable 
Water Resources Agreement represent, on one level, a rather 
modest step toward the development of institutions for 
transboundary ecosystem governance in the Great Lakes Basin—
modest because those instruments are narrowly crafted to achieve 
the limited objective of keeping water in the Basin.  Their 
significance lies in the fact that they create a new kind of 
institutional architecture for management of Basin resources, 
creating cooperation and policy harmonization across all ten Basin 
states and provinces, and establishing transboundary regional 
institutions with real decision-making authority, operating at a 
Basin-wide scale.  In so doing, they demonstrate both that it is 
 
because the Great Lakes Water Resources Compact provides for termination by 
majority vote, that is the operative rule.  The default rule in international treaty 
law provides somewhat more liberal opt-out terms: under Article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a non-breaching party may unilaterally 
terminate or suspend its treaty obligations upon material breach by another party, 
and under Article 62 a party may terminate in the event of a “fundamental change 
of circumstances” if it “radically . . . transform[s] the extent of obligations still to 
be performed under the treaty.”  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 113.  Compact, supra note 7, § 7.3.2.a.  Presumably, a suit by one or more states 
to compel another state’s compliance with the Compact would fall within the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States.  See U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2. 
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possible to devise transboundary governance arrangements for 
management of a natural system and that it is possible to generate 
transboundary normativity without international law. 
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